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THE CONTENT OF WHISTLEBLOWING PROCEDURES: A 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF RECENT OFFICIAL GUIDELINES. 
ABSTRACT 
There is an increasing recognition of the need to provide ways for people to raise concerns 
about suspected wrongdoing by promoting internal policies and procedures which offer 
proper safeguards to actual and potential whistleblowers. Many organisations in both the 
public and private sectors now have such measures and these display a wide variety of 
operating modalities: in-house or outsourced, anonymous/confidential/ identified, multi or 
single tiered, specified or open subject matter etc. As a result of this development, a number 
of guidelines and policy documents have been produced by authoritative bodies. This article 
reviews the following five documents from a management perspective, the first two deal with 
the principles upon which legislation might be based and the others describing good 
management practice: the Council of Europe Resolution 1729 (COER); Transparency 
International „Recommended Principles for Whistleblowing Legislation‟ (TI); European 
Union Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion (EUWP); International Chamber of 
Commerce „Guidelines on Whistleblowing‟ (ICC); and the British Standards Institute 
„Whistleblowing arrangements Code of Practice 2008 (BSI). 
 
 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
Academic research on whistleblowing has been undertaken since the 1980‟s. The vast 
majority of this research has concentrated on the person raising concerns in an attempt to 
identify a psychological or sociological profile of the whistleblower (see Miceli, Near, & 
Manuscript (excluding authors' names and affiliations)
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Dworkin, 2008 for the latest meta study), or identify the organisational conditions that lead to 
external reporting (see for example Keenan, 1995; Rothschild & Miethe, 1999). Cross-
cultural research has mainly analysed stated intentions to report wrongdoing (e.g. Keenan, 
2007; MacNab et al, 2007). Whilst acknowledging the importance and impact this research 
has had on the way we view the whistleblower (a hero or a villain, or simply someone taking 
their job responsibilities seriously) and hence on the public and legislative discourse around 
protection, this article explores the „management side of whistleblowing‟. Questions relating 
to the design and implementation of internal whistleblowing policies/procedures have 
become urgent, as many corporate governance codes around the world today prescribe 
whistleblowing policies/procedures as part of best practice. However, corporate governance 
principles or regulations do not prescribe in detail how such internal whistleblowing 
provisions ought to be designed and implemented. Responding to the need for some guidance 
on this, a number of authoritative bodies have issued guidance on internal whistleblowing 
policies/procedures. This article describes the content of recent guidelines and comments on 
their implications for the design and implementation of whistleblowing policies and 
procedures. 
We draw on the existing literature to develop a framework and then use structured content 
and documentary analysis techniques to critically review the following five guidelines about 
how to manage whistleblowing: the Council of Europe Resolution 1729 (COER, 2010); 
Transparency International „Recommended Principles for Whistleblowing Legislation‟ (TI, 
2009); the British Standards Institute „PAS 1998:2008 Whistleblowing arrangements Code of 
Practice‟ (BSI, 2008); ICC „Guidelines on Whistleblowing‟ (ICC, 2008); and the EU Article 
29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion (EUWP, 2006). It should be noted that the first 
two focus on the principles on which legislation might be based and the others describe good 
management practice.  The remainder of the article consists of the following: Section two 
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describes the framework used for our review; Section three offers a comparison; Section four 
comments on the gaps and contradictions identified in the previous section and Section five 
offers some general conclusions. 
 
SECTION 2: FRAMEWORK 
A structured content analysis draws relevant information from published material and a key 
feature is that „only specific information sought by the researcher is coded‟ (Jauch, Osborn, & 
Martin, 1980: 517). Hence, this section develops the framework through which the five 
guidelines will be analysed. However, whereas structured content analysis is used to quantify 
written data sources (Jauch et al, 1980; Larsson, 1993), our intention is to critically compare 
the guidelines on specific aspects of whistleblowing policies/procedures. Thus, we use 
structured content analysis only to the point where we can establish policy categories in the 
guidelines. Rather than drawing categories from multiple readings of our data, we develop 
our framework from the existing literature on the management side of whistleblowing. We 
employ documentary analysis to identify the extent to which the guidelines converge or 
contradict each other in particular policy areas. Finally, we try to explain contradictions and 
gaps by looking at specific document characteristics such as: who wrote it, for whom, and 
why. 
From the literature, we have discerned 16 policy issues and these constitute our framework. 
These were either repeatedly identified in the normative literature as being important 
elements of a fair  or efficient whistleblowing procedure/policy, or they featured as a variable 
in research on whistleblowing in  more than one study.  We now briefly discuss these 16 
categories. 
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Who can blow the whistle? Hassink et al (2007) analysed the content of whistleblowing 
policies at 56 leading European companies and recorded the incidence of statements 
indicating that all employees, the entire group, contractors, and former employees could use 
the procedure. In researching whistleblowing procedures in higher education institutions and 
local authorities, Lewis (2006) also included students, members of the public, suppliers, 
councillors, and the self-employed. In their survey of whistleblowing procedures in the UK‟s 
top 250 FTSE firms, (Lewis & Kender, 2007, 2010) draw on the broad definition of „worker‟ 
in the UK Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 and consider the issue of who can use a 
whistleblowing procedure to be  crucial . 
What issues should be covered? Vandekerckhove (2006) traces how the process of policy 
formulation through successive Parliamentary Bills and position statements from lobbying 
groups has limited the types of wrongdoing that qualify as protected disclosures and 
considers this narrowing to be an ethical risk. In reporting on research in the Australian 
public sector, Roberts (2008) finds that the acceptance that a broad spectrum of concerns 
should fall within the scope of a procedure leads to better outcomes i.e. the wrongdoing gets 
corrected and the whistleblower does not experience unfair treatment. Other research also 
measures this variable (Hassink et al, 2007; Lewis 2006; Lewis & Kender 2007, 2010). 
To whom can one raise a concern? Vandekerckhove (2006) advocates whistleblowing 
legislation that would protect whistleblowers when they disclose to the media. He elaborates 
this position by developing a three-tiered approach which draws on existing legislation, 
research from the whistleblower perspective and the evolution of the public debate about 
protection (2010b). According to his model, a whistleblower should first raise a concern 
inside the organisation. The second tier consists of institutions that have controlling power 
over first tier bodies and are mandated as proxies of society (regulators, or parliamentary 
ombudspersons). Finally, a third tier disclosure is to the public, for example through the 
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media. The rationale of the model is that each successive tier holds the previous one 
accountable for dealing appropriately with both the concern raised and the person raising it. 
Since this accountability requires all three tiers to be available, the absence of any one of 
them undermines the ability of procedures to generate positive outcomes. The importance of 
specifying in a policy/procedure to whom whistleblowers can raise their concern is confirmed 
by empirical research. Hassink et al (2007) found internal whistleblowing policies/procedures 
identified 20 different recipients within organisations with whom concerns could be raised. 
Lewis (2006) and Lewis and Kender (2007, 2010) recorded the extent to which 
whistleblowing procedures also identify an external recipient to whom individuals can take 
their concern should raising the matter internally prove unsatisfactory. Brown (2008) found 
that identifying both internal and external recipients leads to better whistleblowing outcomes. 
 
How should one raise a concern – in-house, outsourced? As private sector companies began 
to design and implement internal whistleblowing policies/procedures, a number of auditing 
companies  developed whistleblowing „hotlines‟ as a business to business service. Whereas 
public sector organisations tend to operate whistleblowing procedures themselves or through 
a specialist public sector body (which can still be considered in-house), private companies 
might want to outsource this. Because employee trust in a whistleblowing procedure is 
regarded as an important factor affecting its use (Miceli et al, 2008), we include the in-house 
versus outsourced operation of whistleblowing procedures as part of our framework. Lewis 
and Kender (2007, 2010) and Brown and Olsen (2008) have also examined this issue in their 
research. 
Two other important aspects of whistleblowing policies/procedures involve the question of 
how concerns must be raised. The first regards the report mode: should concerns be raised in 
written or oral form and must this be done in person or via „hotlines‟? The second issue is 
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whether concerns can be raised confidentially or also anonymously. Vandekerckhove (2010a) 
points out there is an ongoing debate about the latter. The possibility of anonymous reporting 
might make it easier for individuals to raise an issue but confidential reporting (where the 
identity of the whistleblower is known only to the recipient) facilitates investigations. Park, 
Blenkinsopp, Oktem and Omurgonulsen (2008) found that respondents in the UK, Turkey 
and South Korea showed a preference for blowing the whistle anonymously through internal 
and formal procedures. Hassink et al (2007), Lewis (2006), and Lewis and Kender (2007, 
2010) deemed these aspects important enough to treat them as variables in their research.  
A further category is what system is used for recording and tracking reports. Are concerns 
logged centrally even when they are resolved locally, is there a company-wide database? 
Brown and Wheeler (2008) suggest this is crucial for effective whistleblowing procedures 
and have included it in their „agenda for action‟. 
Is whistleblowing a right or a duty? Vandekerckhove (2006, 2010a) suggests that there is a 
tendency in whistleblowing legislation and policies/procedures to institutionalise the 
employee as the guardian of organisational legitimacy, with the consequence that 
whistleblowing risks being perceived as a duty rather than a right that needs to be protected. 
Hassink et al (2007) found that a substantial number of internal whistleblowing policies used 
wording which suggested that raising a concern is compulsory and employees might be held 
accountable for failing to do doing so. Tsahuridu and Vandekerckhove (2008) and 
Vandekerckhove and Tsahuridu (2010) have further theorised on this. 
Whistleblowing legislation is designed to protect whistleblowers from various forms of 
reprisal under specified conditions. One aim of internal whistleblowing policies/procedures 
might be to avoid corporate liability for dealing inadequately with whistleblowers by 
providing internal routes for raising concerns. Hence, one aspect of our framework is whether 
or not explicit mention is made of  retaliation/reprisals or the protection of internal 
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whistleblowers. This is also one of the points on the „agenda for action‟ identified by Brown 
and Wheeler (2008) and it has been taken up in various empirical research (Hassink et al, 
2007; Lewis, 2006; Lewis & Kender, 2007, 2010; Roberts, 2008). 
A perennial issue is the motive of the whistleblower.Vandekerckhove (2006) discovered that 
in nearly all debates about whether or not to have a whistleblowing policy/procedure, the 
argument was made that employees would abuse the facility. A proper motive is often a key 
element for courts in deciding whether or not to protect a whistleblower. However, 
Vandekerckhove (2010a) points out that it is not clear why whistleblowers disclosing 
accurate information about wrongdoing with a personal rather than a public interest motive 
ought not to be protected or listened to. In their research Lewis (2006) and Lewis and Kender 
(2007, 2010) examined  whether procedures  included the requirement of good faith and 
whether they  mentioned that malicious reporting might result in disciplinary action. Hence, 
we include requiring good faith /dealing with malicious reporting as a category in our 
framework. 
Connected to this is the issue of rewarding the whistleblower. Miceli and Near (1992) 
commented that  the US False Claims Act 1989,which offers whistleblowers a percentage of 
what the government is able to recover on frauds as a result of the information the 
whistleblower has provided, introduced a new approach in which information took priority 
over motivation. More recently, Carson, Verdu, and Wokutch (2008) have provided ethical 
arguments in favour of rewarding whistleblowers. Vandekerckhove (2010a) discusses 
rewarding whistleblowers as an ongoing theme.  
Finally, we include five matters that relate to the institutional context of internal 
whistleblowing. Vandekerckhove (2006) found that, with the exception of the Netherlands 
and Canada, labour unions had not been demanding better whistleblower protection. In 
France and Germany, unions have taken corporations to court over the introduction of 
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whistleblowing policies/procedures, arguing that they were unlawful and certainly not 
welcoming them. However, Vandekerckhove (2006) and Lewis (2006) suggest unions have a 
positive role to play in designing and implementing whistleblowing procedures. Lewis and 
Kender (2007, 2010) recorded the extent to which unions are involved in this way. Skyvenes 
and Trygstad (2010), in research on the prevalence of whistleblowing in Norway, have 
explained the high percentage of successful and unproblematic internal whistleblowing they 
found as being facilitated by the high level of unionisation. Hence, involvement of labour 
unions or other stakeholders is included as part of our framework. 
A number of authors indicate that providing independent advice to whistleblowers is an 
important aspect of fair and effective whistleblowing procedures (Vandekerckhove, 2006, 
Brown & Olsen, 2008, Brown & Wheeler, 2008). Lewis (2006) and Lewis and Kender (2007, 
2010) researching in the UK, have measured the extent to which whistleblowing policies 
/procesdures made reference to independent advice from Public Concern at Work or other  
bodies. Any whistleblowing policy/procedure will identify certain key players for its 
implementation, along with a specification of their roles and responsibilities. Who 
investigates concerns, who has operational responsibilities? As Lewis (2006) and Roberts 
(2008) show, there are many possible permutations here so we will scrutinise the guidelines 
in relation to these issues. 
As with all policies and procedures, whistleblowing policies/ procedures need to be 
monitored and reviewed. Lewis (2006) and Lewis and Kender (2007, 2010) have examined to 
what extent and how existing whistleblowing procedures provide for monitoring and review 
and who conducts them. Last but not least, whistleblowing outcomes depend on how people 
react when a concern is raised. Hence, as Brown and Wheeler (2008) point out, we should 
expect procedures/policies to be complemented by training for those receiving and 
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responding to reports. Lewis (2006) and Lewis and Kender (2007, 2010) have researched to 
what extent this is the case in the UK. 
 
SECTION 3: COMPARING THE FIVE GUIDELINES 
This section compares the guidelines using the framework developed in section two. Table 1 
provides a synoptic overview of the comparison, and indicates the level of agreement. Where 
guidelines mentioning a particular aspect use different wording but amount to the same 
advice, the status is shown as „consensus‟. If guidelines give different yet compatible advice, 
we describe this as „convergence‟. When guidelines offer contradictory advice we classify 
them as „incompatible‟. However, this classification does not take into account the gaps in 
some of the guidelines on important aspects of a whistleblowing policy/procedure. Such 
omissions will be commented on in section four.  
 
The guidelines vary in specifying what kind of concerns whistleblowers should be allowed to 
raise. TI, ICC, and BSI differ slightly in wording but all three offer a broad delineation of 
subjects. However, the EUWP guideline requires the issue to be serious enough for 
whistleblowing to be a legitimate way of creating awareness of types of financial malpractice. 
This reflects the fact that whistleblowing has increasingly been seen as a useful tool in the 
fight against fraud and corruption (Vandekerckhove, 2006; Carr & Lewis, 2010). As regards 
the distinction between raising a grievance and a concern about wrongdoing, the BSI Code 
suggests that the former has no public interest dimension. Although there are frequent 
attempts to distinguish whistleblowing from the making of a self-interested complaint, we 
would argue that it is not necessarily true that those who report wrongdoing are not directly 
or personally affected. Significantly, the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
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(ACAS) recognises that potential problems can arise from procedural overlap and in their 
Foreword to the latest Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures 2009 it is 
stated that “Organisations may wish to consider dealing with issues involving bullying, 
harassment or whistleblowing under a separate procedure” (ACAS, 2009: 2). 
There are only limited differences in relation to whether or not whistleblowing ought to be 
confidential rather than anonymous. ICC takes no position while TI states that both types of 
reporting must be available. BSI advises that concerns are best raised openly i.e. neither 
confidential nor anonymous. However, it acknowledges that in practice circumstances might 
not make that a feasible option so it is recommended that confidential channels should also be 
put in place. Indeed, even full confidentiality will be subject to exceptions, for example, 
where the discloser may have to be identified for disciplinary purposes or to report suspected 
wrongdoing to the police or a Regulator. BSI does not advise against anonymous reporting 
but suggests that workers should not be actively encouraged to go down this path. The EUWP 
guideline is similar to BSI i.e. schemes should not advertise nor encourage anonymous 
disclosures but these may be accepted. The COER acknowledges that confidential disclosures 
fuel less mistrust than anonymous ones and suggests that the identity of a whistleblower 
should only be revealed with his or her consent “or in order to avert serious and imminent 
threats to the public interest” (COER, 2010: para 6.2.1.2).  
All the guidelines emphasise the importance of offering adequate protection to 
whistleblowers. In particular, COER highlights the danger of “offering a „shield of 
cardboard‟ which would entrap them by giving them a false sense of security” (para 5). Thus 
attention is drawn to the need to deal with any form of retaliation. In addition, mention is 
made of exposing those who undertake reprisals to counter –claims from the victim “with the 
intention of having them removed from office or otherwise sanctioned” (para 6.2.6). In 
practice, this will simply mean that employers should add the victimisation of whistleblowers 
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to the list of matters that will be regarded as serious misconduct and dealt with firmly under 
the disciplinary procedure.  
The five guidelines indicate that the making of a knowingly false report should lead to 
disciplinary action. However, they differ in terms of how they describe the „good faith‟ 
needed for whistleblowers to be protected. EUWP states the whistleblower‟s identity may be 
disclosed when a report is both false and maliciously made. ICC requires a whistleblower to 
be bona fide while TI explicitly limits „good faith‟ to the honest belief that the information is 
true at the time of disclosure, regardless of the whistleblower‟s motive. By way of contrast, 
COER states that the „good faith‟ requirement will be satisfied if “he or she had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the information disclosed was true [...] provided her or she did not 
pursue any unlawful or unethical objectives” (COER, 2010: para 6.2.4). It almost goes 
without saying that employers would be ill–advised to include such a caveat without 
specifying what will be treated as unlawful or unethical objectives. Apart from the practical 
difficulties involved in trying to establish a person‟s motives or objectives, we would argue 
that they are irrelevant where the discloser has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
information is true. Related to this is the importance of offering rights to a person who is 
wrongly suspected of malpractice and this is a matter emphasised by ICC, COER and EUWP.  
Without actually contradicting each other, the guidelines offer very different advice about 
which stakeholders to include in the process of establishing whistleblowing schemes. EUWP 
states that national data protection authorities should formally endorse the policy. BSI advises 
employers to consult on the arrangements with staff, managers and recognised trade unions. 
The authors of this article believe that consultation and negotiation are not only vital as a 
matter of principle but that they will also be particularly important in trying to deal with the 
problem of procedural overlap i.e. to identify the precise circumstances in which grievance, 
whistleblowing, bullying\harassment and disciplinary procedures can be invoked. Provisions 
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for monitoring and review are also important. For example,, in the UK if a procedure is 
defective it may be easier to persuade an employment tribunal that an external disclosure was 
reasonable under Section 43G and 43H ERA 1996. BSI and TI advise the inclusion of 
relevant stakeholders in monitoring and reviewing the whistleblowing scheme. Additionally, 
the BSI guideline specifies what the review should focus on
1
 and urges that the key findings 
should be communicated to staff. 
There is a basic consensus on the extent to which concerns about wrongdoing should be 
recorded and filed but different emphasis is placed by the respective guidelines. The ICC is 
straightforward in stating that all reports should be acknowledged, recorded, and screened. 
EUWP strongly advises that personal data should be kept separate from reports of alleged 
wrongdoing and that personal data should not be kept longer than necessary. BSI makes 
reference to the EUWP view on this matter but adds that only those who receive a concern 
outside of line management should keep records and log them centrally. As we argue below, 
the variations noted here are connected to the different approaches taken in the guidelines to 
training and who should have responsibility for whistleblowing measures. 
The issue of rewarding whistleblowers is a highly contentious one yet the guidelines under 
consideration differ only slightly in their approaches. TI states that it depends on the context 
whether or not rewards should be used and does not rule out schemes which offer financial 
incentives for people to raise concerns. BSI suggests that rewards should not be offered in a 
policy but should be left to the discretion of the Board. In this respect it is worth noting that 
in the UK Sections 43G and 43H ERA 1996 do not protect disclosures that have been made 
for personal gain. By way of contrast, it is generally acknowledged that the system of 
                                                             
1 Para 6.1 recommends that a review should consider the following four elements: “(i) Ensure that staff are 
aware of and trust the whistleblowing avenues;(ii) Make provision for realistic advice about what the 
whistleblowing process means for openness, confidentiality and anonymity;(iii) Continually review how the 
procedures work in practice;(iv) Regular communication to staff about the avenues open to them.” 
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allowing qui tam suits under the US False Claim Act 1989, which allows citizens to get 15-
25% of sums recovered by the Government, is regarded as being highly successful.
2
 
On other matters the guidelines are less compatible with each other. TI, COER, ICC and BSI 
all broadly describe who can blow the whistle. Indeed, TI suggests that concerns about 
national security should be catered for and COER recommends that members of the armed 
forces and special services should be covered.  At the other extreme, we find it rather strange 
that EUWP suggests that it might be appropriate to limit the number of persons eligible to 
report (and the number who may be incriminated). Interestingly, ICC suggests that customers 
might be covered by a whistleblowing procedure while the BSI advises against extending 
such a scheme to members of the public or consumers. In this regard, we would point to the 
research conducted in the UK which shows that many public sector employers have 
procedures which recognise that customers and users of services may well be a valuable 
source of information about suspected wrongdoing (Lewis, 2006). 
The guidelines vary substantially in the modes of reporting they recommend. ICC leaves it up 
to each individual enterprise to define the kind of communication channels it wants to use. 
On the other hand, BSI expressly states that employees should be encouraged to raise 
concerns verbally. Their reasoning being that most concerns are raised orally so it would be 
counter-productive to require employees to submit them in writing. Nevertheless BSI 
suggests that a record should be kept of key details and a copy given to the worker where the 
procedure is invoked. It is recommended that those outside line management should have 
records that are logged centrally and it goes without saying that these must comply with the 
                                                             
2 Between 1986 and 2007, the equivalent of £5.6 million was awarded in judgments. 
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principles contained in Schedule 1 of the Data Protection Act 1998.
3
 However, as EUWP 
observed, a balance has to be struck between the rights of whistleblowers and data subjects 
and the organisation‟s need to investigate allegations of wrongdoing. 
There are differences about whether whistleblowing should be regarded as a right (voluntary) 
or a duty (compulsory). The ICC leaves this to each individual enterprise to decide. While the 
BSI recognises that in certain circumstances people have a statutory obligation to disclose 
information, it explicitly advises against making it a requirement that employees blow the 
whistle. Good management practice and UK employment law
4
 demand that if a contractual 
duty is imposed it should be enforced consistently. Thus if one person raised a concern but 
others who knew about the matter did not, questions would need to be asked. However, many 
employers would not regard such an investigation as being either conducive to good 
industrial relations or a particularly sensible use of resources.  
There is disagreement about who should have responsibility for operating whistleblowing 
policies/ procedures. BSI states that every manager has a role to play in a whistleblowing 
scheme and advises that employees should be encouraged to raise concerns with their line 
manager first. However, EUWP states that there should be a specific organisational unit 
within the company or the group dedicated to handling whistleblower‟s reports and this 
should be strictly separated from other departments such as human resources. TI suggests that 
there should be an independent body receiving complaints about retaliation. The ICC 
recommends that senior personnel be in charge of the whistleblowing unit, whereas the BSI 
                                                             
3   For example, Principle 4: “Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date” and 
Principle 5: “Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary 
for that purpose or purposes”.  
4  Arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable behaviour may undermine the common law implied duty of trust and 
confidence found in contracts of employment. 
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does not advise a separate unit but suggests that overall responsibility should be taken at a 
high level with the organisation. 
The approach of the guidelines to training is consistent with the levels of responsibility 
described above. Because BSI sees an important role for line managers in whistleblowing 
procedures, it advises that all managers should be briefed on how to handle cases. 
Additionally, those with a specific role in the whistleblowing arrangements should be trained 
in the operation of the procedure. On the other hand, because it recommends that a 
whistleblowing procedure should be operated by a specific organisational unit, EUWP only 
sees training as necessary for people in that specialist unit. Worryingly absent from most of 
the guidelines under discussion is mention of the need to train workers in how to invoke a 
whistleblowing procedure.
5
  
 
SECTION 4: GAPS IN THE GUIDELINES 
From the synoptic overview in table 1, it can be seen that the BSI guidelines cover the full 
range of issues we deem to be important in managing whistleblowing but all the others have 
gaps. This might be for a variety of reasons and this section speculates about why there are 
omissions. 
Our assumption is that if an issue is regarded as important by the drafting body then a 
position on it will be taken in the guideline. We identify four reasons why an issue might not 
be perceived to be important: 1) it is not seen as relevant for the target audience, 2) a position 
on the particular matter is thought to be obvious given that taken elsewhere, 3) a particular 
                                                             
5  BSI refers to the training of senior managers and advocates that workers should be briefed by line managers 
when the policy is introduced or changed. By way of contrast, the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
acknowledges the need to educate staff about the whistleblowing policy and train them how to raise and handle 
concerns (ICA 2004).  
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stance is thought to be common sense and therefore does not need to be articulated, 4) the 
drafters mistakenly regarded the issue as unimportant or simply forgot it. We discuss below 
the types of gap that emerge from our comparative analysis. 
A first pattern reflects the historical evolution of whistleblowing activism and research. As 
mentioned in our introduction, there has been much attention focussed on the whistleblower 
and there is relatively little on how to manage whistleblowing, i.e. how to organise and 
respond to it. The elements in our framework on which all of the guidelines take a position 
relate to the whistleblower. These are: who can blow the whistle, the requirement of good 
faith, confidentiality, protection, and the nature of the concerns that can be raised. The first 
two deal with the kind of whistleblower we want to encourage and the others deal with 
protecting the whistleblower. In our view, the gaps in the guidelines demonstrate that the 
management of whistleblowing beyond the whistleblower is still at a formative stage, i.e. we 
do not seem to be addressing the added value of whistleblowing in terms of risk management 
and organisational learning. 
A second pattern is where both the COER and the TI guidelines have omissions. These are 
whether to operate a whistleblowing procedure in-house or outsource it, how to record 
reports, whether whistleblowing should be compulsory or not, the involvement  trade unions 
or other stakeholders, and the provision of  training. This constitutes a pattern because both of 
these guidelines have omissions in six areas, although there are only two instances where 
COER has a gap but not TI. An obvious explanation for this is that the COER and TI 
guidelines focus on how to develop whistleblowing legislation, whereas the others are 
targeted at organisations. In this sense, the gaps relate to matters which the COER and TI did 
not believe needed to be resolved.  On the mode of reporting, the EUWP guideline is also 
silent. The most probable explanation for this is that its position is implied from the context. 
More precisely, as the EUWP is concerned with making whistleblowing policies/procedures 
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compliant with privacy laws, their focus is on what is actually „on file‟ and oral reports would 
not come under their radar. Also absent in the EUWP guidelines is comment on whether 
whistleblowing is a right or a duty. One explanation is that they found the issue so obvious 
that they did not feel the need to explain it. 
 
There are also two omissions in the ICC guidance. One is on the issue of involving trade 
unions or other stakeholders. Although this may well reflect the business orientation of this 
body, we still think the ICC is mistaken in failing to discuss this matter. By way of contrast, 
the BSI guideline suggests that the implementation of a whistleblowing procedure can only 
be successful if it genuinely engages people in the organisation. The second gap in the ICC 
document relates to training.  It might be suggested that this is because the ICC views the 
provision of training as a natural implementation step or it regards the introduction of 
whistleblowing policies/procedures only as a matter of compliance with corporate 
governance laws. In that case, the absence of comment about training is unfortunate because 
compliance mode thinking is not an appropriate approach to making whistleblowing 
procedures work. 
As regards the availability of advice to potential whistleblowers (table 1 point 13), the BSI, 
COER and TI offer guidance whereas the others do not. One possible explanation is that 
those drafting these documents regarded the provision of advice as an important pre-requisite 
to the successful implementation of whistleblowing legislation but not of organisational 
procedures. We regard the provision of independent advice as a vital requirement for making 
procedures work and would argue that the failure of guidelines to discuss this matter is a 
serious omission. Related to this is the question of access to counselling. Many employers 
recognise that it may well be in their own interest to provide helplines and procedures 
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frequently refer to the services offered by Public Concern at Work. Perhaps more contentious 
is whether reference should be made in whistleblowing policies/ procedures to the availability 
of either union or legal advice. 
This brings us to a third set of omissions where there is no immediately identifiable pattern. 
The first is the importance of providing recipients of concerns at several levels within and 
outside of the organisation. The EUWP and ICC guidelines are silent in this respect. Since we 
do not regard the matter as purely one of common sense, we are forced to the conclusion that 
the gap is the result of error. In addition to the BSI, many employers believe that it is 
appropriate for concerns to be raised initially with the line manager but that there must also 
be readily available alternatives.
6
 This is not only because the line manager might be 
suspected of participating in wrongdoing but also to allow a worker to pursue the matter 
internally if he or she is not satisfied with the line manager‟s response. Good practice might 
well be to allow individuals to go directly to the organisation‟s chief executive in exceptional 
circumstances and certainly to have access to that person if lower tiers of management do not 
appear to have dealt adequately with the information disclosed. Critical to this is the 
provision of timely feedback, since if people are not kept informed about the progress of any 
investigation they may well assume that their concerns are not being properly addressed.
7
 
Indeed, it might be argued that it is useful to communicate generally the outcome of 
investigations in order to encourage people to raise concerns. Given that in the UK, Part IVA 
ERA 1996 protects external disclosures in specified circumstances, employers would be well 
                                                             
6  BSI proposes two internal levels as alternatives. ”At the second tier, it might be one or more trusted 
individuals, the key specialist functions, or divisional or regional managers. At the top level, it could be an 
internal hotline or the Finance Director, the Group lawyer and/or a non-executive Director.” By way of contrast, 
Bowers, Fodder, Lewis, & Mitchell (2007) suggests a separate dedicated unit as an alternative to line managers.  
7 Although the BSI is of the view that time limits are unlikely to be appropriate, some employers find it helpful 
to have time estimates for each stage of the procedure. 
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advised to indicate the kinds of outside body that they feel it might be appropriate to contact, 
for example, an industry regulator, the police or local M.P. 
The second area where there are gaps in the guidelines is the provision of rewards for 
whistleblowing. This is the case in respect of the COER, EUWP and ICC, although for two of 
them their position is implied from their approach to other issues. The COER is very clear 
that the whistleblower should not be pursuing unethical objectives and offering a reward as 
an incentive to raise concerns would be questionable in this respect. The EUWP approach on 
advertising schemes implicitly suggests offering rewards is a bridge too far. Furthermore, we 
can speculate that its position on storing whistleblowing data would make it quite hard to 
offer rewards. This would require storage of data about who received the reward, its amount 
and for what specific reason. As this constitutes financial data, it must be stored for a period 
which is longer than that necessary to investigate and rectify occurring wrongdoing.  
However there is no ready explanation for the issue not being addressed in the ICC 
guidelines. Given that offering rewards to whistleblowers is currently in practice only in the 
US, we can assume that the ICC regarded this issue as not important for its target group. We 
recommend that guidelines for the management of whistleblowing should take an explicit 
stance on the issue of rewards. 
The third issue where a gap was found but no clear pattern emerged is the roles and 
responsibilities of key players. The COER is the only body guilty of this omission and 
because it is largely concerned to urge member states (as well as its own institution) to 
introduce legislation, it is possible that it felt that specifying roles was not critical as this 
stage. 
The final area in which some guidelines have gaps but there is no discernable pattern is the 
monitoring and review of whistleblowing procedures. The EUWP as well as the ICC 
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guidelines are silent in this respect. If those drafting these documents thought their position 
on this logically followed from their approach to the key players (i.e. that the key players 
ought to monitor), then a quick look at the other guidelines shows that these two aspects are 
not necessarily related. Thus, in our view, it is unfortunate that both the EUWP and ICC did 
not explicitly provide guidance about who should be involved in reviewing and improving 
whistleblowing policies/procedures. 
 
SECTION 5: CONCLUSION 
We feel that our comparison of the various guidelines has been revealing. While identifying 
areas of consensus and convergence, we have also discovered contradictions and omissions. 
Given the different purposes for which the guidance has been produced, perhaps we should 
not be too surprised that there is no uniformity of approach in these documents. Equally, in 
the light of the empirical research and other published material available to the various 
drafting bodies, it is rather disappointing that there are some serious omissions in relation to 
crucial aspects of the management of whistleblowing. Indeed, it does not seem unfair to 
conclude that, perhaps with the exception of the BSI, the authors of the guidelines seem to 
have fallen into the trap of focussing on the whistleblower rather than the process of handling 
his or her concerns. In a way this is understandable because historically much attention has 
been paid to the individual who discloses information about wrongdoing rather than how 
management should respond. However, given that many countries now have whistleblowing 
legislation in place, and that the implementation of internal whistleblowing 
policies/procedures is increasingly mentioned in corporate governance codes, there is an 
urgent need to concentrate on the process rather than the person.  
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Finally, in assessing how to react to the guidance that now exists on the contents of 
whistleblowing policies/procedures, employers should also consider the impact of anti-
corruption legislation. In the UK for example, the Bribery Act 2010 Section 7 makes the 
failure by a commercial organisation to prevent bribery a criminal offence but it is a defence 
to prove that there were in place “adequate procedures designed to prevent 
persons...undertaking such conduct”. Section 9 imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to 
publish guidance about procedures that can be put in place and a consultation paper has been 
circulated by the Ministry of Justice.
8
 In our opinion, a key question for employers is whether 
to have in place an anti-corruption policy/procedure alongside a general whistleblowing 
policy/procedure. An alternative view would be that  there is a danger of procedural overload 
and that all wrongdoing should be reported through the same channel on the basis that the 
recipient of concerns will be trained to refer them to an appropriate person for investigation 
.To some extent the answer will obviously depend on the nature of the official guidance that 
is eventually provided by the relevant authority in a particular state (for the UK that is the 
Secretary of State), but employers would be well advised to consider the general issue of 
procedural overlap. For some time now empirical research has suggested that whistleblowing 
procedures are already being used where grievance, health and safety and equal opportunity 
procedures etc would seem to be more appropriate (Lewis, 2006; Lewis & Kender 2010). 
There could be many reasons for this, including the absence of a specialised procedure, the 
fact that it is perceived to be ineffective, or that it has been invoked but failed to satisfy a 
particular individual. It could also be argued that other procedures are not taken as seriously 
and that employers respond more carefully when the whistleblowing procedure is invoked 
because of compliance concerns and the fear of external disclosures. Whatever the causes, it 
cannot be in anyone‟s interest to have confusion about how concerns should be raised so we 
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would urge employers to think carefully about both the contents of whistleblowing 
policies/procedures and their relationship to other workplace procedures.  
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Category COER TI EUWP BSI ICC Status 
1. For who? Broad 
Includes journalist 
sources 
Broad Limited  Broad 
Should not include members 
of public or consumers 
Broad 
Includes customers 
Incompatible  
2. About 
what? 
Broad Broad Issue must be serious 
enough (financial 
malpractice) 
Broad Broad Convergence
, except 
EUWP 
incompatible 
3. Several 
tiers to 
raise 
concerns? 
Internal 
whistleblowing first, 
bypassing hierarchy, 
but external must be 
possible 
Safe internal 
procedures, easy 
external (also to 
media) 
 External disclosure routes 
must be identified. This will 
encourage managers to take 
internally raised concerns 
seriously. 
 Consensus 
4. In-house 
or out-
house? 
  Both are acceptable Both are acceptable Both are acceptable Consensus 
5. Report 
mode 
   Encourage verbal mode Individual enterprise 
can decide preference 
Incompatible  
6. Confident
iality/ 
anonymit
y 
Stresses importance 
of  confidentiality; no 
mention made of 
anonymous routes 
Both must be 
available 
Schemes should not 
advertise anonymous 
reports but these should 
be accepted 
Encourage raising concerns 
openly, confidential must be 
available, advises against 
anonymous reports 
Individual enterprise 
can decide either 
Convergence 
7. Recording 
reports 
  Keep personal data 
separate from complaint 
reports (no unnecessary 
storage of personal data) 
Only those receiving 
whistleblower reports 
outside of hierarchical 
should log them centrally 
All reports must be 
acknowledged, 
reported and screened 
Incompatible 
8. Right / 
duty 
   Advises against making it a 
general requirement to blow 
the whistle 
Individual enterprise 
can decide either 
Incompatible 
9. Protection 
& 
reprisals 
Emphasise 
importance of 
adequate protection 
to whistleblowers; 
retaliators must be 
exposable to counter-
claims 
Emphasise 
importance of 
adequate protection 
to whistleblowers 
Emphasise importance of 
adequate protection both 
to whistleblowers and 
accused persons 
Emphasise importance of 
adequate protection to 
whistleblowers 
Emphasise 
importance of 
adequate protection 
both to 
whistleblowers and 
accused persons 
Convergence 
10. Good 
faith & 
Knowingly false 
reports subject to 
Knowingly false 
reports subject to 
Identity may be disclosed 
when making knowingly 
Knowingly false reports 
subject to disciplinary 
Knowingly false 
reports subject to 
Convergence 
on 
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malicious 
reports 
disciplinary action. 
Must have honest 
believe information 
is true, and not 
pursue unlawful or 
unethical objectives 
disciplinary action. 
Must have honest 
believe information is 
true, regardless of 
motive 
 
false reports. 
 
action. 
 
disciplinary action. 
 
knowingly 
false reports, 
incompatible 
on role of 
motive 
11. Rewards  Use of rewards to 
encourage whistle-
blowing depends on 
context 
 Advises against reward 
policy, rather rewards can be 
given upon discretion of the 
board 
 Incompatible  
12. Involving 
trade 
unions / 
stake-
holders 
  National data protection 
authorities must rubber 
stamp the policy 
Consult on arrangements 
with staff, managers, and 
any recognised union 
 Convergence 
13. Advice  NGOs can contribute 
to the general attitude 
to whistleblowing, 
and to providing 
advice to employers 
and employees on 
whistleblowing 
A public body should 
be in place providing 
general public advice 
on matters relating to 
whistleblowing 
 Independent, confidential 
advice should be available 
for employees 
 Consensus  
14. Roles and 
responsibi
lities of 
key 
players 
 Independent body 
receives and handles 
complaints about 
retaliation 
Specialised staff 
(independent from HR) 
receives and handles 
whistleblower reports 
Every manager must be 
involved 
High level personnel 
must be supervising 
policy 
Incompatible  
15. Monitorin
g & 
review 
Independent body 
must monitor and 
review 
Involve stakeholders  Involve staff, managers and 
unions 
 Convergence 
16. Training    Train specialised unit Brief all managers on how to 
handle cases, additional 
training for those with 
specific roles 
 Incompatible 
Table 1. Relevant elements in five guidelines on whistleblowing 
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ABSTRACT 
There is an increasing recognition of the need to provide ways for people to raise concerns 
about suspected wrongdoing by promoting internal policies and procedures which offer 
proper safeguards to actual and potential whistleblowers. Many organisations in both the 
public and private sectors now have such measures and these display a wide variety of 
operating modalities: in-house or outsourced, anonymous/confidential/ identified, multi or 
single tiered, specified or open subject matter etc. As a result of this development, a number 
of guidelines and policy documents have been produced by authoritative bodies. This article 
reviews the following five documents from a management perspective, the first two deal with 
the principles upon which legislation might be based and the others describing good 
management practice: the Council of Europe Resolution 1729 (COER); Transparency 
International ‘Recommended Principles for Whistleblowing Legislation’ (TI); European 
Union Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion (EUWP); International Chamber of 
Commerce ‘Guidelines on Whistleblowing’ (ICC); and the British Standards Institute 
‘Whistleblowing arrangements Code of Practice 2008 (BSI). 
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